Airport Screening

Airport screening has become an essential component of transportation security policy in the United States following a security breach that precipitated the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Fritteli, 2005).Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Airport Screening specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More In response to the terrorist attacks, the US Congress moved with speed to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which in turn established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to ensure the security of the travelling public through screening of passengers for explosives and other dangerous items (Blalock, 2007; Lord, 2012). Although the TSA mandated a federalized workforce of security screeners to conduct inspections on online passengers and their luggage, available literature demonstrates that this piecemeal and reactive mandate resulted in significant cost increases, adverse privacy impli cations, and inconveniences (McLay, Lee, Jacobson, 2010). The present paper measures the impact of the federalization of airport screening and attempts to advocate for a more responsive, intelligence-based, and technology-focused screening aimed at cutting costs, ensuring passenger privacy, and reducing inconveniences. Impact of Federalization of Airport Screening Understanding the Federalization of Airport Screening The two fundamental changes in airport security visible to passengers after the terrorist attacks included â€Å"the federalization of passenger security screening at all US commercial airports by November 19, 2002, and the requirement to begin screening all checked baggage by December 31, 2002† (Blalock, 2007, p. 2). When TSA officially took over the mandate for airport security in February 2002, it embarked on an effort to substitute private security screeners with federal employees who were charged with the responsibility of conducting passenger-screening ope rations at all US commercial airports. TSA not only embarked on hiring 56,000 federal screeners to help reduce waiting time in security lines but also increased the compensation and training of screeners by offering them higher wages and expanding training requirements (Blalock, 2007). Fritteli (2005) argues that federalizing the screener workforce was offered as a potential solution to address the challenges of high staff turnover, low wages, poor supervision and training, as well as lack of regulatory oversight.Advertising Looking for essay on air transport? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Impacts and Concerns This paper looks into three impacts related to the federalization of airport screening, namely travelers’ inconveniences, privacy concerns, and cost implications. The discussion around inconvenience is embedded in the fact that, although greater confidence in the safety of air travel has been found to trigger de mand, the inconvenience of security procedures that necessitate additional time and effort on the part of travelers due to the high expectations associated with airport screening may indeed minimize demand for air travel (Blalock, 2007). The intrusive security measures occasioned by the federalization of airport screening (e.g., arbitrary hand-searches of travelers and their carry-on luggage, expansive inspection and prohibitions on non-dangerous items) have been found to minimize the convenience of air travel, resulting in lost revenues for airline companies as potential travelers choose to stay at home (Hessick, 2002). Although studies have found that travelers often value-enhanced airport security and are prepared to allow some extra inconvenience and/or high prices in order to feel more secure and confident (Blalock, 2007), the requirements for additional time and effort on the part of customers have been found to substantially reduce passenger convenience in domestic and foreig n arenas (Hessick, 2002). From the ongoing, it is evident that risk-based approaches to airport screening such as selective screening and behavioral profiling can be used to avoid unnecessary passenger inconveniences in contemporary airport security operations. As postulated by McLay et al. (2010), selective screening applies high-order security technologies and procedures on a targeted cluster of high-risk passengers and employs lower levels of scrutiny to screen low-risk passengers. However, as acknowledged by Markarian, Kolle, and Tarter (2011), it is always essential to have a prescreening system that undertakes an accurate risk assessment of passengers before their arrival at the airport to enhance the accuracy of passenger assessment. On its part, behavioral profiling is able to minimize passenger inconveniences by focusing attention to high-risk passengers (Poole Carofano, 2006). Due to lack of passenger privacy that followed the implementation of the new security procedures such as the federalization of airport screening and comprehensive baggage screening, a huge decline in passengers flying shorter trips was noted as such passengers preferred to drive to their destinations (Blalock, 2007). Calculations demonstrate that the substitution of flying for driving by travelers seeking to safeguard their privacy not only led to fatal road accidents but also triggered a slump in traveler volumes as well as airline profit margins (Selzer, 2003). Available literature demonstrates that the creation of multiple levels of security (e.g., concentric protection) may indeed be more effective than treating all passengers the same, particularly in terms of safeguarding their privacy and removing bottlenecks that trigger privacy concerns (McLay et al., 2010).Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Airport Screening specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Security frameworks such as concentric protection are not intrusive to passengers as they help to integrate security systems and increase the level of penetration difficulty through what is commonly referred to as defense in depth (Markarian et al., 2011). In terms of costs, airline companies are of the opinion that â€Å"the increased inconvenience caused by security measures has cost them billions in lost ticket revenues as potential business travelers opt to stay at home† (Blalock, 2007, p. 8). Tough security measures imposed by the TSA through the federalization of airport screening and comprehensive screening of baggage, though appropriate in thwarting terrorist attacks, have nevertheless imposed a huge cost in terms of reduced profits in the airline industry and less tax revenue for the federal government due to stunted ticket sales (Selzer, 2003). Plan Validation It is evident that the federalization of airport screening has witnessed adverse outcomes in terms of travelers’ inconveniences, privacy concerns and cost imp lications, though it has had a corresponding increase in security (McLay et al., 2010). The solution to these adverse outcomes and concerns, it seems, is nested on the development of a more responsive, intelligence-based and technology-focused screening process that utilizes the federal and private workforce of screeners. Federal screeners will be included in the plan as many travelers feel safer with federal security screeners as opposed to private ones (Blalock, 2007), while private screeners will be included for their innovation and flexibility to provide screening services more competently and with superior customer service (Lord, 2012). The combination of safety, efficiency, competency and enhanced customer service will be instrumental in reducing travelers’ inconveniences and reinforcing privacy. As already acknowledged, the proposed plan will include three main components, namely responsiveness, intelligence collection, and technology. It is essential to have a compete nt and flexible workforce to man the responsiveness component of the plan. These human resources will be sourced from the private sector as available literature demonstrates that private airport screeners are more innovative, flexible, and competent in customer service than federal screeners (Lord, 2012). Overall, this workforce will be charged with the responsibility of implementing risk-based approaches to airport screening (e.g., selective screening and behavioral profiling) with the view to ensuring that the interventions are more responsive to the needs and expectations of travelers.Advertising Looking for essay on air transport? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More As demonstrated in the literature, â€Å"the risk-based approach would produce significant cost savings in both capital and operating costs, while targeting those funds spent on airport security toward the passengers more likely to pose threats to people and property† (Poole, 2006, p. 27). Additionally, it is now common knowledge that selective screening is a useful technique in reducing costs and waste of scarce security resources as air travelers are not treated equally in terms of threat potential (Poole Carofano, 2006). This way, it is assumed that the private screeners will have the capacity to substantially reduce travelers’ inconveniences and associated costs due to the responsive nature of available airport security interventions. The intelligence collection component of the plan will be allocated to duly qualified and competent federal screeners and their mandate will entail the use of available security and safety systems, existing criminal databases, and ri sk-based prescreening techniques to identify passengers and baggage for inspection. The use of these systems and risk-based screening techniques in airport safety operations will increase travelers’ confidentiality and privacy while ensuring that sufficient levels of safety are maintained to deter terrorist attacks (Edwards, 2013). It is proposed that the screening force will be part of the intelligence collection fraternity and will be directly involved in providing concentric circles of security to, among other things, (1) help separate sensitive areas from the airside or other areas, (2) provide defense in depth by instituting another gateway that needs to be altered from a less-secure environment to a higher-secure environment, (3) assist in the integration of security systems for effective airport screening, and (4) enhance the level of penetration difficulty (Markarian et al., 2011). This workforce is also expected to focus on the ‘human factor’ of security provisions and exercise comprehensive due diligence, common sense, and consistency to be useful in the provision of optimal passenger safety using a methodology that does not violate passenger safety (Canody, 2015; McLay et al., 2010). Overall, such screening interventions are bound to increase aviation safety and decrease privacy and confidentiality violations. Lastly, both federal and private screeners will be exposed to emerging safety technologies and information technology (IT) solutions to ensure the optimal uptake of technology-focused interventions in airport screening. Use of state-of-the-art security technologies will be useful in decentralizing operations, re-orienting security policies along risk-based lines, as well as devolving screening functions to each individual airport for efficiency and effectiveness (Poole, 2006). The workforce handling emerging technology devices must be trained to improve airport security by targeting more of these sophisticated devices towar ds passengers who pose comparatively more significant risk of harm and developing technology-focused screening methodologies that are able to rely on various datasets to quantify the threat potential of a passenger as opposed to undertaking full screening. Such a technology-focused platform for airport screening, in my view, will substantially reduce passenger inconveniences, address privacy concerns and cut operating costs. Furthermore, the emerging technology and IT infrastructure can be used in aviation environments to integrate security systems for optimal productivity and efficiency. Conclusion This report has not only measured the impact of federalization of airport screening in terms of passenger inconvenience, privacy concerns and cost implications but also advocated for a more responsive, intelligence-based and technology-focused airport screening intervention to remedy the situation. The proposed plan will utilize a mix of federal and private airport screeners as the two g roups have their unique skills and competencies. Overall, it is felt that the proposed plan will be useful in addressing the deficits and contributing towards an effective and efficient airport screening system. Comprehensive training of the workforce is critical in making the proposed plan a reality. References Blalock, G., Kadiyali, V., Simon, D. H. (2007). The impact of post-9/11 airport security measures on the demand for air travel. Web. Canody, H. (2015). Smarter Security. Air Transport World, 52(7), 20-22. Edwards, C. (2013). Privatizing the transport security administration. Web. Fritteli, J. (2005). Transportation security: Issues for the 109th congress. Web. Hessick, F. A. (2002). The federalization of airport security: Privacy implications. Whittier Law Review, 24(2), 43-69. Lord, S. M. (2012). Screening partnership program: TSA should issue more guidance to airports and monitor private versus federal screener performance. Web. Markarian, G., Kolle, R., Tarter, A. (2011 ). Aviation security engineering: A holistic approach. London, UK: Artech House. McLay, L. A., Lee, A. J., Jacobson, S. H. (2010). Risk-based policies for airport security checkpoint screening. Transportation Science, 44(3), 339-349. Poole, R. W. (2006). Airport security: Time for a new model. Web. Poole, R. W., and Carofano, J. J. (2006). Time to rethink airport security. Web. Selzer, M. (2003). Federalization of airport security workers: A study of practical impact of the aviation and transportation security act from a labor law perspective. Journal of Labor and Employment Law, 5(2), 363-381. This essay on Airport Screening was written and submitted by user Emilia Z. to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.

Biography of Francisco Madero, Led Mexican Revolution

Biography of Francisco Madero, Led Mexican Revolution Francisco I. Madero (October 30, 1873–February 22, 1913) was a reformist politician and writer and president of Mexico from 1911 to 1913. This unlikely revolutionary helped engineer the overthrow of dictator Porfirio Dà ­az by kick-starting the Mexican Revolution. Unfortunately for Madero, he was caught between remnants of Dà ­azs regime and the revolutionaries he unleashed and was deposed and executed in 1913. Fast Facts: Francisco Madero Known For: Father of the Mexican RevolutionBorn: Oct. 30, 1873 in Parras, MexicoParents: Francisco Ignacio Madero Hernndez, Mercedes Gonzlez Trevià ±oDied: Died Feb. 22, 1913 in Mexico City, MexicoSpouse: Sara Pà ©rez Early Life Francisco I. Madero was born on Oct. 30, 1873, in Parras, Coahuila, Mexico, to wealthy parents- by some accounts, the fifth-richest family in Mexico. His father was Francisco Ignacio Madero Hernndez; his mother was Mercedes Gonzlez Trevià ±o. His grandfather, Evaristo Madero, made lucrative investments and was involved in ranching, wine-making, silver, textiles, and cotton. Francisco was well educated, studying in the United States, Austria, and France. When he returned from the U.S., he was placed in charge of some family interests, including the San Pedro de las Colonias hacienda and farm, which he operated at a profit, introducing modern farming methods and improving worker conditions. In January 1903, he married Sara Pà ©rez; they had no children. Early Political Career When Bernardo Reyes, governor of Nuevo Leà ³n, brutally broke up a political demonstration in 1903, Madero became politically involved. Although his early campaigns for office failed, he funded a newspaper that he used to promote his ideas. Madero had to overcome his image to succeed as a politician in macho Mexico. He was small with a high-pitched voice, making it difficult to command respect from soldiers and revolutionaries who saw him as effeminate. He was a vegetarian and teetotaler, considered peculiar in Mexico, and an avowed spiritualist. He claimed to have contact with his dead brother Raà ºl and liberal reformer Benito Juarez, who told him to maintain pressure on Dà ­az. Dà ­az Porfirio Dà ­az was an iron-fisted dictator in power since 1876. Dà ­az had modernized the country, laying miles of train tracks and encouraging industry and foreign investment, but at a cost. The poor lived in abject misery. Miners worked without safety measures or insurance, peasants were kicked off their land, and debt peonage meant that thousands were essentially slaves. He was the darling of international investors, who commended him for â€Å"civilizing† an unruly nation. Dà ­az kept tabs on those who opposed him. The regime controlled the press, and rogue journalists could be jailed without trial for libel or sedition. Dà ­az played politicians and military men against one another, leaving few threats to his rule. He appointed all state governors, who shared the spoils of his crooked but lucrative system. Elections were rigged and only the foolish tried to buck the system. Dà ­az had fought off many challenges, but by 1910 cracks were showing. He was in his late 70s, and the wealthy class he represented worried about his successor. Years of repression meant the rural poor and urban working class loathed Dà ­az and were primed for revolution. A revolt by Cananea copper miners in 1906 in Sonora had to be brutally suppressed, showing Mexico and the world that Diaz was vulnerable. 1910 Elections Dà ­az had promised free elections in 1910. Taking him at his word, Madero organized the Anti-Re-Electionist Party to challenge Diaz and published a bestselling book titled  The Presidential Succession of 1910. Part of Maderos platform was that when Dà ­az came to power in 1876, he claimed he wouldnt seek re-election. Madero insisted that no good came from one man holding absolute power and listed Dà ­azs shortcomings, including the massacre of Maya Indians in the Yucatan, the crooked system of governors, and the Cananea mine incident. Mexicans flocked to see Madero and hear his speeches. He began publishing a newspaper,  El Anti-Re-Electionista, and secured his partys nomination. When it became clear that Madero would win, Dà ­az had most of the Anti-Re-Electionist leaders jailed, including Madero, arrested on a false charge of plotting armed insurrection. Because Madero came from a wealthy, well-connected family, Dà ­az could not simply kill him, as he had two generals who had threatened to run against him in 1910. The election was a sham and Dà ­az â€Å"won.†Ã‚  Madero, bailed out of jail by his wealthy father, crossed the border and set up shop in San Antonio, Texas. He declared the election null and void in his â€Å"Plan of San Luà ­s Potosà ­Ã¢â‚¬  and called for armed revolution. November 20 was set for the revolution to begin. Revolution With Madero in revolt, Dà ­az rounded up and killed many of his supporters. The call to revolution was heeded by many Mexicans. In the state of Morelos,  Emiliano Zapata  raised an army of peasants and harassed wealthy landowners. In the state of Chihuahua,  Pascual Orozco  and  Casulo  Herrera raised sizable armies. One of Herreras captains was ruthless revolutionary  Pancho Villa, who replaced the cautious Herrera and, with Orozco, captured cities in Chihuahua in the name of the revolution. In  February 1911, Madero returned from the U.S. Northern leaders including Villa and Orozco didnt trust him, so in March, his force swollen to 600, Madero led an attack on the federal garrison at Casas Grandes, which was a fiasco. Outgunned, Madero and his men retreated, and Madero was injured. Although it ended badly, Maderos bravery gained him respect among the northern rebels. Orozco, at that time leader of the most powerful rebel army, acknowledged Madero as leader of the revolution. Not long after the battle, Madero met  Villa  and they hit it off despite their differences. Villa knew he was a good bandit and rebel chief, but he was no visionary or politician. Madero  was a man of words, not action, and he considered Villa a Robin Hood,  just the man to oust Dà ­az. Madero allowed his men to join Villas force: His days of soldiering were done. Villa and Orozco pushed toward  Mexico City, scoring victories over federal forces along the way. In the south, Zapatas peasant army was capturing towns in his native state of Morelos, beating superior federal forces with a combination of determination and numbers. In May 1911, Zapata scored a huge, bloody victory over federal forces in the town of Cuautla. Dà ­az could see that his rule was crumbling. Dà ­az Quits Dà ­az negotiated a surrender with Madero, who generously allowed the former dictator to leave the country that month. Madero was greeted as a hero when he rode into Mexico City on June 7, 1911. Once he arrived, however, he made a series of mistakes. As interim president, he accepted Francisco Leà ³n de la Barra, a former Dà ­az crony who coalesced the anti-Madero movement. He also demobilized Orozcos and Villas armies. Maderos Presidency Madero became president in November 1911. Never a true revolutionary, Madero simply felt that Mexico was ready for democracy and Dà ­az should step down. He never intended to carry out radical changes, such as land reform. He spent much of his time as president trying to reassure the privileged class that he wouldnt dismantle the power structure left by Dà ­az. Meanwhile, Zapata, realizing that Madero would never approve real land reform, took up arms again. Leà ³n de la Barra, still interim president and working against Madero, sent  Gen. Victoriano Huerta, a brutal remnant of Dà ­azs regime, to Morelos to contain Zapata. Called back to Mexico City, Huerta began conspiring against Madero. When he became president, Maderos only remaining friend was Villa, whose army was demobilized. Orozco, who hadnt gotten the huge rewards he had expected from Madero, took to the field, and many of his former soldiers joined him. Downfall and Execution The politically naive Madero didnt realize he was surrounded by danger. Huerta was conspiring with American ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to remove Madero, as Fà ©lix Dà ­az, Porfirios nephew, took up arms along with Bernardo Reyes. Although Villa rejoined the fight in favor of Madero, he ended up in a stalemate with Orozco. Madero refused to believe his generals would turn on him. The forces of Fà ©lix Dà ­az entered Mexico City, and a 10-day standoff known as la  decena  trgica (â€Å"the tragic fortnight†) ensued. Accepting Huertas â€Å"protection,† Madero fell into his trap: He was arrested by Huerta on Feb. 18,  1913,  and executed four days later, though Huerta said he was killed when his supporters tried to free him. With Madero gone, Huerta turned on his fellow conspirators and made himself president. Legacy Although he wasnt a radical,  Francisco Madero  was the spark that set off the  Mexican Revolution. He was clever, rich, well-connected, and charismatic enough to get the ball rolling against a weakened Porfirio Dà ­az, but couldnt hold onto power once he attained it. The Mexican Revolution was fought by brutal, ruthless men, and the idealistic  Madero  was out of his depth. Still, his name became a rallying cry, especially for Villa and his men. Villa was disappointed that Madero had failed and spent the rest of the revolution looking for another politician to entrust with the future of his country. Maderos brothers were among Villas staunchest supporters. Later politicians tried and failed to unite the nation until 1920, when Alvaro Obregà ³n seized power, the first to succeed at imposing his will on the unruly factions. Decades later, Madero is seen as a hero by Mexicans, the father of the revolution that did much to level the playing field between rich and poor. He is seen as weak but idealistic, an honest, decent man destroyed by the demons he helped to unleash. He was executed before the bloodiest years of the revolution, so his image is unsullied by later events. Sources McLynn, Frank.  Villa and Zapata: A History of the Mexican Revolution.  Basic Books, 2000.Francisco Madero: President of Mexico. Encyclopedia Brittanica.Francisco Madero. Biography.com.